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Cyberjacking,
Mouse trapping,
and the FTC Act:
Are Federal ConsumerProtection
Laws Helping or Hurting Online
Consumers?

by
Kenneth Sanney
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sites has caused your computer to freeze up. You conour law firm just launched a website to increase
its exposure in the local community and beyond. The
team who designed the site invested endless hours,
effort, and resources conducting market research, perfecting program design, and performing technical
upgrades of the support systems. The finished product
reflects their hard work; the site is sleek and sophisti-

template shutting down your computer, but you know
doing so will cause you to lose all of the unsaved work.
Additionally, you know that shutting down your computer with programs open can damage their operation,
not to mention your hard drive. But then again, you see
no other option at this point. So, frustrated and deject-

cated, yet user-friendly and reliable. And best of all (at

ed, you slowly press the power button and watch as the
monitor goes dark.

least from one perspective), you have a profile page on

To make matters worse, your wife returns looking for

the site.
One evening while working on your monthly bills, it

an explanation. She thinks that you were visiting these
pornography sites before she and the kids came into the

dawns on you that you haven't shown your family the
new site. Eager to show off a bit-after all, your picture

room.

is on the Internet now-you minimize the program
you're working on and open your web browser. You call
to your wife, your twelve-year-old daughter, and your
seven-year-old son.
When all three arrive, you click the search icon of
your browser so that you can show them how prospective clients can find your firm's site using a simple keyword search. The design team, you explain, put a lot of
thought into the site's metatags 1 in order to make the
site easy to find. Using the search engine, 2 you type in
a few words that best describe your firm's area of practice, your city, and the word "law." The results do not
disappoint; displayed prominently, fourth from the top,
is a link to your firm's website. You double-click on it
and the site downloads-leaving you, your wife, and
your two children looking at three naked women. The
address of the site you are on is not your firm's website,
but <www.taboo.com>. You stab at your browser's back
button, but another porn site pops up, this time it is
"TabooSisters.com."
More explicit images fill your
screen. Surprise now gives way to anger as you thrash
with the mouse, trying to click the close button of your
"Daily
browser.
The
second you
succeed,
Sexgames.com" appears, complete with banner ads for
companion sites offering pictures of unnatural sexual
acts with animals. You ask aloud, "what's going on?" as
your wife hurries your children from the room while
shooting you an angry look.
You click on the browser's back button again, and
another porn site pops up. Each attempt to leave these
sites or to close your browser causes another porn site
to open. You then attempt to restore the minimized program in order to save your work. But the deluge of porn

You declare your innocence, but you have no

explanation as to how these sites appeared when you
hit the back button. Unbeknownst to you, a company
specializing in cyber-scams

engineered your entire

World Wide Web ordeal by catching you in a "web" of its
own. First, they hijacked or "cyberjacked" your firm's
website by reposting a version that redirects unsuspecting visitors to the never-ending series of pornographic
sites you now know a little too well. Having captured
you inside that ring, the pornography company used a
technique called "mousetrapping" to frustrate all efforts
to leave, keeping you firmly held in their grip. In short,
while you may not have known about it before it happened to you (or possibly even afterwards), you've just
fallen victim to the latest rage in Internet fraud-a
scam as effective as it is invisible, as simple to execute
as it is hard to regulate.
Currently, for example, only the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) can bring a federal cause of action
against a company whose business practices or actions
deceive consumers. 3 However, the FTC's power is limited; it can intervene on behalf of consumers only when
there is a pattern of misconduct by the business that
threatens the public interest. 4 But where the scams
themselves are difficult to spot, patterns may be virtually impossible to establish. Moreover, even successful
FTC actions may yield little in the way of preventative
or compensatory benefit for the individual user.
My aim in this Note, therefore, is
to offer one possible means of providing a happy ending to the story of
deceptive trade practices on the
Internet. The first section briefly
addresses the background of the
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Internet, its technical aspects, and the current state of

sible via the web.

Internet regulation.

Next, an overview of the FTC's

(HTTP) defines a set of standards for transmitting web

"deceptive trade practices" cause of action, using the
recent Federal Trade Commission v. Pereira 5 case will

pages across the Internet. The Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) is a standardized naming convention for
identifying a web document or file-in a sense, it is the

give an extended illustration of not only the mechanics
of modern cyber-scams, but also the efficacy of current
regulatory and protective regimes aimed at stopping

The HyperText Transfer Protocol

address of a website. 9 The United States Government

them. Finally, I will propose that the FTC Act should be

once licensed URLs, but for the last several years they
have been controlled by private companies (one of the

amended to give private citizens a cause of action

largest is Network Solutions, located in Virginia).

against deceptive trade practices and fraud on the
Internet, and that such an amendment should offer

Putting all of these elements together, the basic struc-

enhanced damages and attorneys' fees in order to

HTML to combine varying forms of content into web-

encourage use of the action. This private cause of action

sites that users may access via HTTP at specified

would broaden the regulatory ability of the Act without

URLs-and all with just a few simple clicks of a mouse

risking the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists on the Internet.

button.

THE INTERNET: HISTORY AND REGULATION

ture of the web becomes apparent.

Programmers use

Of course, technical descriptions of any aspect of the
Internet often miss their true social and cultural importance. Imagine, for instance, describing a book as sev-

While the Internet is no longer a novel concept, its
history and the technology behind it often still is. The

eral ounces of paper, held together by glue, each containing ink placed onto the paper in such a way so as to

story begins with a secret U.S. Department of Defense
feasibility study, started in 1969, called the Advanced

convey messages in a language that allows the person

6

Research Projects Agency network (ARPAnet).

This

study tested methods of enabling computerized command and control networks to survive conventional and
nuclear attack by means of the high-speed rerouting of
messages.
Of course, the primary uses these days are far less
dramatic. In fact, the most common uses of today's
Internet revolve around a single element of the whole,
the World Wide Web. The web is a collection of globally
distributed text, multimedia documents, files, and other
network services linked to create an immense electronic library from which information can be retrieved
quickly by intuitive searches on a search engine.7 To

viewing the ink to receive them. Just as the real importance of books lies in the elegance of Eliot's verse or the
passion of Dostoevsky's prose, so too does the true value
of the Internet come from the ability it gives to its users
to access an immense amount of information (including
the complete works of both of the above) and to communicate with an extensive number of people.
But this value-the virtual eradication of barriers to
communication and information transfers-may also be
the hazard of the Internet. As a technological device,
the Internet surpasses even the printing press for its
ability to spur change. 10 Just as the advent of the printing press caused society to rethink the legal framework

allow the information to be easily accessible, the web

concerning property, the Internet has caused society to
rethink jurisprudence that spans the legal spectrum

uses hypertext technology8 and a graphical interface to
provide easy-to-understand links between related areas

from international intellectual property law to the protection of children. Thus, questions of how and to whom

of content, which may reside on the same computer or

the vast libraries of information on the Internet will be
made available have become the primary concerns

be distributed across many computers around the
world. These links enable the user to change seamlessly between different files or even combine these elements.
The web itself consists of three main elements. The
HyperText Markup Language (HTML) comprises the
programming codes, or tags, that define fonts, layouts,
embedded graphics, and links to other documents acces-

behind attempts at regulation.
For instance, obviously not all information is appropriate for all audiences. Most would agree that some
information, such as pornography, should be restricted
only to adults.

Arguably, other information, such as

design details for weapons of mass destruction, should
be restricted altogether. But when geographical bor-
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experienced the force of this customary law punishment
ders and other tangible reference points become blurred
when, while trying to generate business, it sent out an
or obscured-as they often do on the Internet-effective
advertisement to several newsgroups. In response to
regulation of even the most uncontroversial subjects
K

can be difficult to devise. Then add in other fundamental obstacles to
regulation, such
First

the

as

Amendment, and
available
the
means for combating a perceived
evil become narrower still.
A prime example comes from the
battle to regulate
on
pornography
the

these unrequested, off-topic postings, the firm received
over 30,000 reply mes-

For instance, obviously not all information is
appropriate for all audiences. Most would agree
that some information, such as pornography,
should be restricted only to adults. Arguably,
other information, such as design details for
weapons of mass destruction, should be restricted altogether. But when geographical borders
and other tangible reference points become
blurred or obscured-as they often do on the
Internet-effective regulation of even the most
uncontroversial subjects can be difficult to
devise.

Internet.

While some contend that the dangers of pornographyespecially for children-justify extensive regulation,
others answer by pointing to another danger, that of stifling Internet activity through over-regulation. These
latter theorists prefer to rely on more traditional
means, such as customary law, to prevent any real dangers of Internet pornography without creating even
more problems along the way. In this light, the debate
over pornography-related regulation transforms into a
set of debates over the effectiveness of customary law
and the legitimacy of governmental regulation.
Practically from its inception, an informal set of customary laws has governed the Internet." These laws
consist solely of the generally agreed-upon set of conventions for accessing and interacting in cyberspace.
For instance, convention dictates that users who access
news groups will refrain from making postings that are
Such postings can come in many forms,
off-topic.
including the infamous "spam" 12 posting. Experts and
novices alike generally consider spam to be both a nuisance to users and a potential harm to the systems of
the Internet. Thus, most Internet users frown upon
spamming because it wastes their time, multiplies traf13
fic, and occupies valuable bandwidth.
Accordingly, the Internet community has developed
self-governing systems to "punish" spammers. One of
these "punishments" involves "flaming' the spammer
by sending so many messages to his or her account that
it becomes inoperable. The law firm of Canter & Siegel

sages, the bulk of which
crashed their systems and
resulted in the cancellation of their Internet service. 14
However, the development of such practices,
and indeed the Internet's
customary law as a whole,
has generated criticism
from

many

observers.

These criticisms usually
fall within three basic cat-

egories-one based on justice, the second on scope, and
the third on efficacy. The first category demands little
attention here, as it argues simply that all customary
law regimes are akin to mob rule and are not necessarily just.15
The second category, which addresses the scope of
protection offered by customary law, seems slightly
more sophisticated. It argues that such "regulatory"
schemes only address community interaction and either
ignore deviant and criminal activity or place the burden
of protecting one's self directly on the individual. In the
context of pornography, therefore, these critics contend
that the customary law's only answer to unwanted
explicit content is that users should either avoid the
Internet entirely, avoid sites that are offensive, or pur16
chase software that will filter out offensive material.
Perhaps ironically, proponents of customary law
seem to agree with this assessment, but still advocate it
as a way of ensuring freedom by making regulation
purely an individual (or parental) choice. For instance,
in her 1997 book Net Wars, Wendy Grossman tries to
debunk what she sees as misinformation about Internet
pornography. Recognizing the reasoning for the regulation of broadcast media, 17 Grossman states, "The Net is
not like television. A surprising ...number of non-Net
users believe that you hit a button to connect to the
Internet and pornography just flows, unwanted and
unbidden, across your computer screen."1 8 Grossman
goes on to state that "[i]n general, pornography on the

ii ternet note
net is like anything else on the Net: if you want to find

"The danger posed by [Internet pornography] is partic-

it, you have to go out looking for it .... -19

ularly acute for the nation's children, who are unable to
' 22
guard themselves with the sophistication of an adult.

Thus,

Grossman implicitly concludes that the individual is
responsible for the content they come into contact
with-and therefore also solely responsible for not coming in contact with content they would wish to avoid.
Lastly, critics also attack the efficacy of customary

Such a statement seems to raise important issues
concerning the utility of customary law. One, if the protection of customary law is primarily found in self-protection, how can parents hope to insulate their children

law. They claim that because the Internet has changed
from a medium that was largely publicly owned and

from something like pornography on the Internet?

regulated by systems-operators to a privately owned

tomary law supporters might suggest they should-

and unregulated medium of communication, customary
law is no longer the effective regulatory regime it once

their children will likely still have access to the Internet
at school, in public libraries, and at friends' homes.

was. 20

In other words, according to this school of
thought, Internet privatization conflicts with the stan-

Thus, the children will ultimately have to protect themselves. Of course, the reason for the concern in the first

dards of customary law, leaving the latter without a

place comes from the fact that they may not be able to
do so. In the end, critics like McCain seem to uncover a

viable means of enforcement. For instance, while flaming may work as a deterrent for spamming, it also interferes with the efficiency and profitability of the Internet
economy. After all, if spamming wastes users' time, so

Even if parents do purchase filtering software-as cus-

question that betrays the troublesome circularity of customary law: of what use is a system relying on self-protection when the primary at-risk groups are precisely

does responding to the spammer; in this way, flaming
merely increases the cost of spam. Since the market
finds this result unappealing, it discourages flaming

those that cannot protect themselves?
The problem is that alternative, governmental forms

almost as strongly as it discourages spamming. In
other words, this last critique of customary law sug-

customary law.

gests that customary law has simply turned into mar-

of regulation have often been even less successful than
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the first
major congressional attempt to regulate sexually explicit content on the Internet. 23 Passed in 1997, the
Communications Decency Act (CDA)24 criminalized the "knowing transmission of obscene or

In a recent Senate Report concerning the use
of Internet filtering systems in schools and
libraries, Senator John McCain pointed out one
such segment when he stated, "The dainger
posed by [Internet pornography] is particu larly
acute for the nation's children, who are un able
to guard themselves with the sophisticatio n of
an adult."
ket-led regulation, with norms of acceptable behavior
developing "along the lines of market forces and an
21
industry-regulatory model."
Of course, the obvious conclusion for such critics of

For instance, in Reno v. ACLU, the

indecent messages to any recipient under 18
years of age" and the "knowin[g] sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
'25
activities or organs.

The ACLU contended not only that such inclusive
language could not survive First Amendment scrutiny,
but also that if it did, its operation would stifle the
growth of the Internet in its critical early stages. The
Supreme Court agreed. 26

Writing for the majority,

customary law is that the market will never be able to
regulate the Internet as well as the government. In
particular, these critics point to certain segments of the

Justice

Internet population that may be less able to utilize the
"protection" offered by customary law. For example, in

Grossman's position, he then stated:
Odds are slim that a user would enter a sex-

a recent Senate Report concerning the use of Internet
filtering systems in schools and libraries, Senator John

ually explicit site by accident. Unlike communications received by radio or television,
'the receipt of information on the Internet

McCain pointed out one such segment when he stated,

Stevens

commented

that

encounter such content accidentally."

27

"users seldom
Further echoing

K NN
requires a series of affirmative steps more
deliberate and directed than merely turning
a dial. A child requires some sophistication
and some ability to read to retrieve material
and thereby to use the Internet unattend28

ed.'
As a result, the Court held that, as an overly broad content-based restriction on speech, the CDA could not
withstand constitutional scrutiny.29 Accordingly, the
Court struck down the portions of the Act that aimed to
30
regulate pornographic content.
Formal regulation of spam has often received the
same sort of reception from the courts. In order to support (or supplant) customary law responses to spam,
many states have recently enacted laws that provide for
stiff penalties for spammers. However, two of these
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concerning the Internet. Both the federal and state legislatures routinely feel the need to regulate something
on the Internet-from the high ideals of public morality
to the nitty-gritty details of spam-free inboxes. 3 9 And all
things considered, it's not hard to understand why legislators wish to throw their hats in the ring of Internet
regulation. While customary law may have its continuing uses, the changing face of the online world casts at
least some doubt as to its effectiveness against even the
most obvious and acknowledged problems.
Unfortunately, drafting a superior statute is not as
easy as it seems, and several early entries have fared no
better than their informal counterparts. In fact, many
have fared worse-after all, at least customary law can
stand in harmony with the Constitution. However tidy
regulatory theories may look at first glance, attempts to

state's courts have struck down these statutes on the
grounds that they unduly burden interstate com-

regulate something as large and amorphous as the
Internet come riddled with problems. For instance, who

merce. 31

among us could have predicted the impact the Internet
would have on the music industry, or the craze of online
auctions? How are policy makers, whether politicians

For instance, Washington legislators passed a statute
that prohibited the sending of spam that contained misleading information in its subject line, used a third
party's domain name without permission, or misrepresented the message's point of origin. 32 This statute also
required advertisers to find out whether the intended
recipient's address was registered to a Washington resident. Advertisers could do this by contacting the
intended recipient's Internet domain registrant or
through other sources including public Internet directories. 33 Advertisers were then responsible for removing
all those who appeared on both lists from their solicitation list. 34 Stating that "the Washington Statute is
unduly restrictive and burdensome" on interstate commerce, however, the Washington Superior Court struck
35
down the anti-spam statute.
A California anti-spam statute experienced the same
fate. There, the state had enacted a law requiring bulk
e-mailers to include a valid return address on all unsolicited mailings along with the letters "ADV" in the subject line of advertisments.3 6 Users would then be able to
reply to such mailings and request that they be exempted from the receipt of further messages-a request that,
once received, the spammer would be legally obligated
to honor.37 Again, however, a state court held that the
38
law could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Of course, such results have not exactly put the
breaks on policy makers. In fact, legislation abounds

or industry leaders, to keep up with something so
n0
uncertain?
Perhaps the answer is just this simple: they're not.
Taking into account their mutual (and multiple) failures, before our legislatures enact more regulations to
"save us" from the societal hazards presented by the
Internet, and before others declare the Internet "totally
safe as is," a closer look should be given to the stated
policy goals of the United States concerning the
Internet. Once the destination is known, the task of
choosing an appropriate path becomes somewhat easier.
In this case, a promising path appears to come in the
form of the FTC's pragmatic approach concerning
deceptive acts on the Internet. However, as will be
shown below, even this path is not complete as currently drawn, and in order to reach the ultimate destination, a few novel trails may be required.

A PARADIGM FOR SUCCESS: THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION ACT
The United States has explicit policy goals for the
Internet. As stated by Congress, these goals include:
To promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and interactive media; to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that

i te :ne n te
presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State Regulation; to encourage the

did not limit that traditional equitable power

development of technologies which maximize

explicitly or by necessary and inescapable
46
inference.
As a result, district courts may use their inherent

user control over what information is
received by individuals, families, and schools

equitable authority under §13(b) to grant temporary
restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and any

who use the Internet and other interactive

additional preliminary relief necessary to preserve the
47
possibility of final, effective relief.

computer services; to remove disincentives
for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children's access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material; and to ensure vigorous enforcement of
Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harass41
ment by means of computer.

As suggested by the definition of "deception," the
FTC must prove three elements in order to secure such
relief in any case against a party allegedly engaged in
deceptive trade practices. These interrelated elements
require evidence of (1) an act likely to mislead (2) consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances (3)
48
about a material fact to their detriment.
The issue when applying the first element of this test

To date, the FTC has played an important role in
achieving these goals. As an independent agency creat-

is "whether the act or practice is likely to mislead,
49
rather than whether it causes actual deception."

ed by statute, 42 the Commission enforces Section 5(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits

Where there have been express claims, "the representation itself establishes the meaning."50 In cases of

unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-

implied claims, however, a detailed examination of the

merce.

43

The Act defines "deception" as an act or prac-

tice that is likely to mislead consumers, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a material fact to
their detriment. 44 The Commission has the authority
where such deception exists to authorize its own attorneys to initiate federal district court proceedings in
order to secure such equitable relief as may be appropriate in each case. 45 Section 13(b) of the FTC Act further empowers courts to exercise the full breadth of

representation, including an evaluation of such factors
as the entire document, the comparison of different sections of the document, the nature of the transaction,
and the nature of the claim, must be conducted in order
to judge it misleading. Courts may also consider extrinsic evidence when deciding whether an act or practice is
51
likely to mislead.
The second element demands that the court consider
the act or practice from the perspective of a reasonable

their equitable authority to grant relief concerning

consumer. The totality of the practice should be consid-

deceptive trade practices. As one court explained:
Congress, when it gave the district court

ered when determining how a reasonable consumer
would act in the circumstances. 52 According to FTC pol-

authority
to
grant a
perma-

n e n t
injunct i o n
against

v i o l a-

icy: "To be

The FTC has taken the lead r{ole in pursuing legal remedies,
consisting mainly of res trainin g orders and injunctive relief,
against companies comr nitting these scams. Fortunately, in
applying its traditional "decep tive trade practices" cause of
action to the novel settin g creat ed by the Internet, the FTC has
generally avoided not onl y the kinee-jerk reactionism seen in the
political halls of Washing ton, bu t also the fear of regulation evident in the wake of Reno v. ACL U.

considered
r e a s o nable,

the

interpretation

or

reaction
does

not

any provisions of law enforced by the
Commission, also gave the district court

have to be
the
only
one. When a seller's representation coveys more than
one meaning to reasonable consumers, one of which is

authority to grant any ancillary relief neces-

false, the seller is liable for the misleading interpreta-

sary to accomplish complete justice because it

tion." 5 Furthermore, it is not necessary that the decep-

tions of

K
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tion continue. The seller violates the law even if he
54
later discloses the truth to the buyer.
The third element of the test focuses on the materiality of the deception. "A 'material' misrepresentation
or practice is one likely to affect a consumer's choice of,
or conduct regarding, a product."55 In other words, if
consumers are likely to have chosen differently but for
56
the deception then a misrepresentation is material.
When combined with qualities or actions fulfilling the
first two elements of the test, a material misrepresentation equates to a deceptive trade practice under the
FTC Act.
While novel in technological respects, scams like
cyberjacking and mousetrapping tend to implicate traditional legal doctrines of fraud and deceptive trade
For instance, "deceptive door opener" ads,
which seek to draw customers into a store by offering
products that are not in stock, have long been recog57
nized by the FTC and the courts as violative of the Act.
practices.

Obviously, luring unsuspecting web surfers to unintended destinations from which they cannot escape
(most likely but not necessarily pornographic sites)
would seem to be directly analogous to, if not much
more egregious than, "deceptive door opener" advertising.5 8 Imagine, for example, going to a local electronics
store in hopes of purchasing a DVD player listed in a
sales flyer and discovering not only that the store did
not carry the player, but also that it had suddenly been
converted to an X-rated bookstore-and that, no matter
what you said or did, it refused to let you leave its parking lot.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the FTC has
taken the lead role in pursuing legal remedies, consisting mainly of restraining orders and injunctive relief,
scams.
these
committing
companies
against
Fortunately, in applying its traditional "deceptive trade
practices" cause of action to the novel setting created by
the Internet, the FTC has generally avoided not only
the knee-jerk reactionisim seen in the political halls of
Washington, but also the fear of regulation evident in
the wake of Reno v. ACLU. 59 Rather, it has simply followed the sound legal principal of adapting existing

CONSUMER PROTECTION IN ACTION:
FTC v. PEREIRA
In 1999, University of Massachusetts Professor
David Landrigan uncovered a cyber-scam, like the one
in the introductory example, responsible for luring
unsuspecting web surfers to pornography sites and
When MSNBC reported
trapping them there.
Landrigan's findings, FTC lawyers initiated an investigation of their own. 60 They eventually uncovered what
the agency has declared as "maybe the most pernicious"
6 1
Internet scam they have ever encountered.
Carlos Pereira, one of the defendants, used the techniques of cyberjacking and mousetrapping to snare
unsuspecting Internet users, take them to pornographic websites, and hinder them from leaving by disabling
their computer's Internet browser functions. 62 For such
a deviously effective scam, the execution of Pereira's
plan could have been performed by virtually anyone
proficient in basic web design and Java6 3 programming.
First, he copied legitimate webpages that contained
commonly searched-for terms, such as names of recent
movies, kids games, or even general words like "pie."
He then changed one single line of the JavaScript programming language in the copied pages, inserting the
following redirection command: "<script language=
'JavaScript'> window.location= 'http://www.taboosisters.com/'. 64 Though it may look incomprehensible to
the novice user, such alterations are matters of routine
for web designers that need to redirect surfers to other
5
web locations.6
Having made the above changes, Pereira needed only
to wait for users' Internet searches to reveal the copied
pages. To explain, when a search term is submitted to
a search engine, the engine processes the term through
a self-created index of websites and generates a list of
sites related to the term.66 This process is facilitated by
the use of metatags, which websites use to describe
their content, thereby ensuring that they will be accurately indexed by search engines, and in turn, that

laws to new circumstances-and in doing so, shown
that existing laws can be used effectively to address the
problems posed by the Internet. In all, the FTC has

users who wish to find them can.
Ironically, Pereira recognized that he could use this
accuracy to threaten the reliability of the metatag system. For instance, if cyber-scam artists cyberjack a
website that sells flowers and repost it with a redirect

prosecuted more than one hundred cases of Internet
scams. One such case is discussed in detail below.

command, the metatags-things like florists, flowers,
mail order, roses, etc.-will still allow users searching

i te-net note
with any of those terms to locate the page.

If they

attempt to retrieve it, however, they will be taken to the
location specified in the redirect. In other words, the

riz.com/c_141.htm>,

another

to

<www.tabooanal.com/c_141.htm>-both of which were

user searches for florists, finds florists, but actually

pornography sites run by co-defendant W.T.F.R.C. Pty
Ltd. (WTFRC). Turning his attention to the source code

arrives at a website that advertises anything but flow-

for the original webpages and the copies created by

ers. It is easy to see how a small cyber-startup business
could also use this technique to lure the consumer away
from, say FTD.com, to their small lesser-known cyber-

cyberjacking, Forbes further discovered that the copies

store.

,,69 In all, the FTC tracked down over
tion' metatags .
25 million fraudulent webpages based on cyberjacked

In the Pereira's version of the scam, the "bait" so to

contained "virtually the same content as the original,
including the web page title, and 'keyword' and 'descrip-

sites. 70 These fraudulent webpages contained not only

speak was not flowers, but children's games. In his
investigation, Dean Forbes, attorney for the FTC, used

information about Internet kids games, but also infor-

the AltaVista search engine to perform an innocent

mation about pies, folk music, cars, movie reviews,

'67

Some of the results
search for "kids Internet games.
of the search, including a page entitled "Kids Internet
Games - Home Page," seemed legitimate. 6 However,

sports information, business classifieds, and numerous
other topics.71

when Forbes tried to visit several of the sites, he
revealed the deception. One link took him to <www.ata-

to their falsified counterparts, the second part of the

Once users trying to visit these sites were redirected
scam took over. Having lured unsuspecting users to a
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pornographic website, Pereira then held them captive
by using JavaScript commands to mousetrap users in
the ring of WTFRC's sites. For example, normally users
can click on either the "back" or "close" button in their
browsers in order to remove themselves from any given
website. Doing so once caught in defendants' scam,
however, merely led the users to another pornography

gious ways than simple metatag misrepresentations.
Pereira mislead online consumers through creatively
employing legitimate Internet technology and the actual theft of other business's websites. The search engine
results for the stolen webpages were virtually mirror
images of the results for the original webpages. In this
way, Pereira's cyberjacking scheme created "door open-

site using the simple redirect code.
Having discovered the scam, the FTC petitioned the
court for a permanent injunction and other equitable

ers" on the Internet. As mentioned previously, such
74
"door openers" are deceptive by law.
More broadly, Pereira and his co-defendants' cyber-

relief pursuant to §13 of the FTC Act. The Commission
also moved

jacking itself was deceptive to the reasonable consumer.
use
consumers
When

for a tempo-

r

a

r

y

restraining

purto
Federal Rule
order
suant

Civil
of
Procedure

Where it can, the FTC has ser,ved the Internet policy
goals of United States well. IHowever, the FTC has
limited resources, and cannot continue to police the
Internet in an efficient way through actions like
Pereira. Moreover, the mecbLanics of the FTC Act

search engines to look for
information on the Internet

make it difficult for the FTC tc stop deceptive acts of
this type.

they must be said to act
reasonably. Furthermore,
the use of the mousetrap-

by entering words commonly associated with the
sought-after

information,

65(b)(2).

When evaluating a request for preliminary
injunctive relief in a Section 13(b) case, courts apply the
"public interest" test, which requires them to: (1) weigh

ping technique is not reasonably avoidable because consumers have no warning of what is about to happen to
them. Nor can they do anything about it once they dis-

the equities and (2) find that the FTC is likely to succeed on the merits. 72 Thus, the test for the FTC in pursuing both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
against Pereira, his co-defendants ultimately boiled

cover the trick, as their browsers no longer function
properly. In other words, once hijacked to defendant
WTFRC's adult sites, consumers (including children)
cannot avoid being trapped in the site-which, at least
in Pereira's version of the scam meant looking at

down to the familiar test for deceptive trade practices:
(1) an act likely to mislead (2) consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances (3) about a material fact
to their detriment. As such, the FTC's case was not difficult to make.
Applying the elements of the deceptive trade practices to the acts of cyberjacking and mousetraping was
straightforward. First, the FTC needed to show that
cyberjacking and mousetraping are likely to mislead.
As it is, the simple use of false metatags to lure consumers to sites on the Internet has been found deceptive by itself. In Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring
Services, the court granted a preliminary injunction
against a company that had placed false information in
their metatags. This false information, found the court,
resulted in the deceptive redirecting of consumers to the
73
wrong website.
Of course, in order to prompt consumers to visit
WTFRC's pornographic sites, Pereira misrepresented
the true identity of their websites through more egre-

pornography, whether they have any inclination to do so
or not.
Redirecting consumers to pornography sites materially undermines the consumers' ability to find the information or goods they are looking for. The materiality
can be measured in the consumer's time, their loss of
confidence in the Internet, and most importantly in the
emotional costs that might affect children. Due to the
increase in Internet commerce, this poses a direct
threat to a major section of the American economy.
Lastly, the practice of luring consumers to websites
they never wanted to visit, and then trapping them
there has few if any public benefits-economic or otherwise. The only benefits derived from this scheme go to
unscrupulous opportunists who likely receive revenues
Unhindered,
for each site visit or click-through.
schemes like this one will denigrate the integrity of the
Internet.

i:te ne n te
AMENDING THE PARADIGM:

A

PRIVATE

CAUSE OF ACTION
Where it can, the FTC has served the Internet policy
goals of United States well. However, the FTC has limited resources and cannot continue to police the

action, providing as they do for private causes of action
for deceptive and fraudulent practices in the marketplace. These state statutes and their progeny of case
law also lend federal lawmakers diverse examples to
guide them in appropriately amending the FTC Act to

Internet in an efficient way through actions like
Pereira. Moreover, the mechanics of the FTC Act make

include a private cause of action.

it difficult for the FTC to stop deceptive acts of this type.

model statutes: the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (UDTPA),77 the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices

The problem lies in the statutory scheme by which the
FTC brings an action. To be sure, the FTC's "efforts are

Most UDAP statutes follow the lead of one of three

Act (UCSPA),7 8 or the Unfair Trade Practices and

directed toward stopping actions that threaten con75
sumers' opportunities to exercise informed choice."

Consumer Protection Law (UTP-CPL).79 The UDTPA
provides for a private cause of action in that "a person"

However, the FTC "cannot act to resolve individual

likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice may

problems," but may intervene only when a "pattern of

be granted an injunction under principles of equity and

possible law violations develop. ''76 Considering factors
such as the sheer volume of business, the ease of implementing deceptive practices, the potential scope of

on terms that the court considers reasonable.8 0 Proof of

deception in a market such as the Internet, and the

monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent to deceive is
not required.8 1 The UDTPA also provides for allowance
2
of costs and the award of attorneys' fees.

exponential growth of Internet commerce, the selective,
slow, and often cumbersome FTC policies of enforce-

The UCSPA affords an even greater scope of private
remedies. The UCSPA allows "a consumer" to bring an

ment do not provide adequate protection for consumers

action for a declaratory judgment, an injunction, or the
greater of actual damages or $100.83 Like the UDTPA,
8 4
the UCSPA allows for the recovery of attorneys' fees.

in this new marketplace.
The ultimate answer may just be to combine of all the
regulatory means discussed above into one simple end:
a private federal cause of action under the FTC Act.
Availability of private enforcement would give consumers the opportunity-and with the structure discussed below, the incentive-to pursue acts of deception
and fraud on the Internet, while simultaneously deterring, and imposing responsibility for, bad acts by online
businesses. Furthermore, these types of private actions
avoid the two most frequent problems encountered by

However, under the UCSPA consumers can collect attor8 5
neys' fees only if they are the prevailing party.
The third, and most recent, of these model statutes is
the UTP-CPL. Developed jointly by the FTC and a
committee of the Council of State Governments, this
"little FTC Act" combines sections of the FTC Act with
sections of the two models discussed above. It starts
with §5(a)(1) of the FTC Act, then adds concepts of
deceptive and prohibited practices from the UDTPA and

regulators. First, the First Amendment free speech
problem, as seen in Reno v. ACLU, does not exist when

UCSPA to provide a total of nineteen unfair methods of
86
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

private individuals, rather than the government, perform the "regulatory" function. Second, the constitutional issues regarding interstate commerce, as seen in

Of course, while legislatures are free to adopt these
models in their entireties, many states have produced
significant differences in both the language and appli-

state attempts to regulate spam, obviously would not
undermine the legitimacy of a cause of action brought

cation of their UDAP statutes. For Congress, these
unique state products simply provide more models on

pursuant to federal law. Therefore, a private federal

which to base amendments to the FTC Act. Moreover,
since each state's version comes with a history of use,

cause of action based on the FTC Act would allow for
timely, effective, constitutional regulation of the
Internet, without sacrificing the qualities named in the
Congressional policy statement.

Congress can choose among the varying options by looking to the degree of success achieved by each.
From among the many contenders, Arizona's UDAP

State consumer protection statutes-commonly
known as Uniform Deceptive Acts and Practices

statute provides federal legislators with an excellent
example of an effective privatization of consumer pro-

(UDAP) statutes-give ample precedent for such an

tection enforcement.

In DunlaD v. Jimmy GMC of
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Tucson, Inc., the Arizona Court of Appeals applied the
state's UDAP statute in a pragmatic way by providing
injured consumers with an implied private cause of
action against a violator of the Act. 87 Citing Sellinger v.
Freeway, s s the Court also reaffirmed the award of punitive damages in a private enforcement of the statute.
The Court stated that "punitive damages are appropriate where the wrongdoer's conduct is wanton or reckless, shows spite or ill will, or where the conduct demonstrates a reckless indifference to the interests of oth89

ers."

CONCLUSION
one step behind technology.
travel
Law will always
Given that the Internet seems to spawn some new technological advance almost daily, it would be foolish to
expect to find a perfect solution to all of the ills it also
creates. Thus, it is perhaps unfair to condemn ineffectual customary law and unconstitutional governmental

1 Metatags

are the summarizing words or phrases embedded
within the programming of a web page that are used to index
sites.
A search engine is a software program that searches
Internet documents for specified keywords (metatags) and
returns addresses and descriptions of documents in which the
keywords appear.
2

3 Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17, 19-22
(D.D.C. 1971).
4 See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S.
212 (1933) (public interest must be specific and substantial to justify a proceeding by the Commission to prevent
unfair competition, mere misrepresentations and confusion or deception of purchasers being insufficient).
5 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Pereira, No. 99-1367-A, (N.D.Va.
filed Sept. 22, 1999).
6 The Columbia Encyclopedia (6th ed. 2000).
7 Id.

8 Hypertext technology is essentially a database system that
provides links between text, sound, video, and graphic files
and applications.
9 A URL consists of the access protocol (http), the domain
name (www.vanderbilt.edu), and optionally the path to a file
or resource residing on that server (Law/jentlaw/main). See
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language
(4th ed. 2000).
10 Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the
Internet 4 (Fed. Communications Comm'n, Office of Plans

regulation for their mutual failure to achieve the impossible.
But such a caveat neither should nor does preclude
the search for a better solution. For the reasons discussed in this Note, a private federal cause of action
under the FTC Act might be just that-not a perfect
solution, but a better one. While it won't cure every
perceived problem in the online world, such an action
would likely succeed where plenty of predecessors have
failed. It would do so by blending the efforts of individual users found in customary law with the legislative
prescriptions for a free but fair Internet found in congressional enactments-and applying the mix to the
FTC's administration of the FTC Act. Furthermore,
encouraging use of the private action by offering punitive damages and attorneys' fees for victorious plaintiffs
would provide the most effective form of deterrence
against online deception, and thus, the most effective
protection for both the Internet itself and its users. A

and Policy Working Paper No. 31, 1999).
11 See Rob Kitchin, Cyberspace: The World in Wires 103
(1998).
12 Spam is any message or posting, regardless of its
content, that is sent to multiple recipients who have
not specifically requested the mailing. It can also be
multiple postings of the same, off-topic message to
newsgroups or list servers. Other common terms for
spam include UCE (Unsolicited Commercial Email) and
UBE (Unsolicited Bulk Email). Individuals who send
spam typically purchase or harvest lists of email
addresses, then bombard those users with messages
sent from numerous (and often forged) return addressat
Spam,
is
What
Yahoo,
See
es.
http://fl.mail.yahoo.com/py/ymTop.py?y= 1&.rand=ajem
7s3dp7qlb.
Kitchin, supra note 11, at 104. Furthermore, there is new
evidence that spam messages are also a huge drag on the
economy. A European Commission study found that the half
a billion spare messages sent per day worldwide is costing
$9.36 billion. The Commission said that most of this $9.36 billion came from connection costs during the time it takes to
read or delete the junk mail. This figure does not take into
account the time that the average worker looses in their day
sorting through these messages. Lisa Jucca, Web Users Lose
Billions a Year From Junk E-Mail, Reuters, (2001), at
http://dailynews.yahoo.comlh/nm/20010202/wr/eujunkmaildc l.html.
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14 Kitchin, supra note 11, at 186 n.28.
15 Id. at 104.
16 Id. at 105.
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39 Congressional Opposition to a Bit Tax, S. Con. Res. 52,
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726, 748-49 (1978).
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20 Kitchin, supra note 11, at 104.
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22 S. Rep. No. 105-226, at 1 (1998).

40 The rapidly changing nature of the Internet will cause the

law of unintended consequences to be problematic for any policymakers. The law of unintended consequences is a popular
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anytime a policy is applied to a rapidly changing system the
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41 47 USCA § 230; Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
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(1997).
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42 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.
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under age eighteen, or sending patently offensive communications through use of interactive computer service to persons
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ately run without fear of computer viruses. Using small Java
programs called applets, World Wide Web pages can be developed that include a full range of multimedia functions.
64 If one were to encounter such a website, the JavaScript
command can be seen by clicking "View" on the tool bar at the
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sites.
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